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Strategic Dalliances as an Enabler for Discontinuous 
Innovation in Slow Clockspeed Industries: 
Evidence from the Oil & Gas Industry 
 
 
Abstract 
The concept of “strategic dalliances”—that is, non-committal supply relationships that 
a firm can dip in and out of while simultaneously fostering long-term links with other 
suppliers—has emerged as a promising strategy by which organizations can create 
discontinuous innovations.  But does this approach work equally well for every sector 
and how can they be effectively used to help generate discontinuous innovation?  
Towards assessing the role that industry clockspeed plays in the success or failure of 
strategic dalliances, we provide case study evidence from Twister BV, an upstream oil 
and gas technology provider, and show that strategic dalliances can be an enabler for 
the discontinuous innovation process in slow clockspeed industries.  Implications for 
research and practice are discussed and conclusions from our findings drawn. 
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Introduction 
Discontinuous innovations (hereafter, DIs) can and frequently do weaken the 
competitive positioning of industry incumbents (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Christensen, 1997).  Nevertheless, literature extols their value as a strategic tool, and 
therefore actively encourages existing firms to use DIs to lead their respective 
industries (Bessant et al., 2005; Leifer et al., 2000).  To this end, several strategies 
have been identified by which an established firm can broaden the radius of ideas and 
technological capabilities it has access to.  Above all, developing links with external 
organizations has received repeated interest (Chesbrough, 2003; Rigby and Zook, 
2002).  The concept of ‘strategic dalliances’—that is, non-committal supply 
relationships that a firm can dip in and out of while simultaneously fostering long-
term links with other suppliers—has emerged from this body of research as an 
approach that is particularly well suited for discovering and developing ideas that lend 
themselves to the creation of DIs (Phillips et al., 2006). 
Building on prior work in the area of DIs and strategic dalliances, questions 
are raised as to whether strategic dalliances are equally appropriate for every industry 
since little research exists to demonstrate how firms can benefit from such weakly-
formed relationships.  To this end, we introduce ideas and evidence from research in 
the area of industry clockspeed to examine these issues.  Evidence suggests that firms’ 
strategic actions in fast-paced industries differ from those in slow-paced industries, 
but, a paucity of studies into these differences exists (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007).  
Indeed, research suggests that firms in fast-paced industries benefit from internal 
strategic flexibility (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007) and close relationships with key 
suppliers (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Conversely, in slow-paced industries, these 
actions may not be adequate bases for competition on the grounds that availability of 
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time affords firms greater opportunity to gradually identify opportunities through 
persistent exposure to novel information from a broad range of weak ties to make 
radical breakthroughs (Hansen, 1999; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007). 
One approach that may be viable to slow-paced industries is the adoption of 
loosely-coupled relationships, where firms gain access to novel information from a 
breadth of non-committal relationships that can inform the creation of DI.  This is in 
contrast to close relationships which are typified by redundancy in knowledge 
(Hansen, 1999). Strategic dalliances offer a novel counterview to the majority of 
studies implying the need for close alliances in efforts to foster DI.  We explore such 
a proposition by presenting case study evidence focusing on the early days of Twister 
BV, a Netherlands-based upstream oil and gas technology provider.  The work 
contributes to our understanding of strategic dalliances, DI, and industry clockspeed.  
We map avenues for futures research and the practical implications of this evidence to 
managers who are trying to create DIs. 
Literature Review and Propositions 
The Motive for Fostering Discontinuous Innovation 
While it is widely recognized that innovation is essential for the future 
prosperity of organizations (Afuah, 1998; Bessant and Francis, 1999), the literature 
also acknowledges that not all innovations are the same.  Some technologies are more 
or less incremental in nature, and modestly improve on a concept that is already 
available in the market.  Others, by stark contrast, conspicuously disturb various states 
of equilibrium in an industry.  Often characterized as “radical,” “competence-
destroying,” or “disruptive,” these DIs are capable of bringing about major upheavals 
in the industries they impact and fundamentally transforming relationships between 
customers and suppliers, restructuring marketplace economics, displacing current 
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products, and creating entirely new product categories (Day and Schoemaker, 2004; 
Leifer et al., 2001; Rothaermel, 2002; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
The introduction of a DI can weaken the competitive positioning of industry 
incumbents (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997).  But incumbent firms 
have also been criticized for their inability to create DIs.  Prior investigations in this 
area explain this by noting that what managers “have been able to do in the past 
strongly conditions what they can hope to do in the future” (Pavitt, 1990, p.18).  
Moreover, legacy organizational structures and know-how often encumber existing 
firms that are trying to create and foster DIs (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Despite the fact that DIs have brought about the demise of several high-profile 
industry leaders, other existing firms have prospered under these conditions (Leifer et 
al., 2000).  In the face of a DI, “some incumbent organizations can and do adapt, 
survive, and regain historic performance levels” (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003, p.257).  
Some existing firms have also leveraged a DI to expand their business in a market 
segment that they created outside of their usual customer base (Gilbert, 2003). The 
“high stakes” nature of DIs and the potential for pronounced market growth have 
motivated researchers to help incumbent firms identify and successfully manage this 
sort of technological change (Afuah, 1998; Leifer et al., 2001).  Other studies go 
further by recommending that existing firms should actively create DIs as a strategic 
tool for leading their respective industries (Bessant et al., 2005; Leifer et al., 2000). 
To help organizations facing this challenge, the literature prescribes that  
established firms develop links with external organizations to broaden the radius of 
ideas and technological capabilities it has access to (Chesbrough, 2003; Quinn, 2000; 
Rigby and Zook, 2002).  The concept of “strategic dalliances” has emerged from this 
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body of research as an approach that is particularly well suited for discovering and 
developing ideas that lend themselves to the creation of DIs. 
Strategic Dalliances 
Establishing and maintaining long-term R&D relationships with outside 
organizations has proved to be a highly successful model of innovation for some firms 
(Cavusgil et al., 2003; Quinn, 2000).  But this tactic may not yield the kinds of 
revolutionary ideas that frequently underpin DIs.  Industry-changing technologies 
often entail doing things differently, and tend to represent a dramatic departure from 
accepted norms and procedures (Phillips et al., 2006).  The literature exploring the 
origins of DIs highlights the frequently serendipitous nature of the relationships 
behind these discoveries (Holton et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 2006).  Many of the 
significant and commercially celebrated DIs that have emerged over the years have 
not been the result of tightly managed research agendas, but were instead brought 
about by a convoluted process of chance and unique circumstances (Afuah, 1998).  
An organization’s “peripheral vision”, the ability to detect an understand 
technological and market trends beyond its core discipline, has been identified as a 
key factor in its ability to take advantage of these serendipitous opportunities (Day 
and Schoemaker, 2004).  To this end, Phillips et al. (2006) prescribe “strategic 
dalliances” as a strategy for maximizing an organization’s chances of discovering a 
good idea outside of its own core discipline. 
Strategic dalliances are rooted in a firm’s ability to “develop a broad range of 
non-committal supply relationships that it can ‘dip in and out of,’ or dally with, in 
concurrence with its longer-term strategic partnerships” (Phillips et al., 2006, p.455).  
Unlike more traditional alliances involving the development and maintenance of long-
term links, strategic dalliances “are not open-ended nor guided by established norms 
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or routines.  Cultural compatibility is not a requisite… The low level of commitment 
allows the relationship to be broken off when there is clearly no chance of success” 
(Phillips et al., 2006, p.455).  These looser affiliations also make possible the 
exploration of “a new sector or new knowledge with little or no resource 
commitment” (Phillips et al., 2006, p.455). 
It is important to emphasize that the strategic dalliances approach to creating 
DIs is not intended to supplant more traditional types of R&D collaboration; rather, it 
ought to augment these efforts.  Prior research has shown that organizations are able 
to manage incremental innovation focused on their core businesses while 
simultaneously trying to develop DIs through practices of experimentation and 
discovery which require different and broader kinds of knowledge to be combined 
together (Christensen, 1997; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996).  Dhanaraj and Parkhe 
(2006), supported by Hansen (1999) and Granovetter (1973), theorize how a firm’s 
innovation network often acts as loosely coupled systems of autonomous firms 
highlighting that a persistent set of weak ties (distant but nonredundant bridges of 
relationships that a firm holds with a variety of stakeholders) are valuable because of 
their efficient knowledge-sharing properties and ability to provide access to novel 
information by bridging disconnected groups and individuals.  Such strategic 
dalliances allow exposure to novel information that could aid in the creation of DI. 
While the concept of strategic dalliances holds significant promise as a means 
for fostering DIs and acting as a catalyst for radically new technologies, there is not 
yet enough evidence to establish that this approach is equally prudent for every sector 
(c.f., Phillips et al., 2006).  Different industries often behave very differently, and 
each is coloured by the subtleties of its history and operating environment (Porter, 
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1980).  One important factor that might impact the success or failure of strategic 
dalliances is the clockspeed of the industry in which it operates. 
The Role of Clockspeed 
Some industries evolve faster or slower than others—that is, they operate at 
different clockspeeds (Fine, 1998).  An industry’s clockspeed is effectively “the 
velocity of change in the external business environment” (Mendelson and Pillai, 1999, 
p.1) that sets the pace of a firm’s internal operations.  Fine (1998) offers several real-
world examples that capture the essence of fast (e.g., semiconductors and athletic 
footwear), medium (e.g., automobiles and pharmaceuticals), and slow clockspeed 
industries (e.g., petrochemicals and commercial aircraft).  Whilst it is true that every 
organization exhibits both fast and slow clockspeed characteristics from time to 
time—for example, slowly changing industries may be faced with periods of frenetic 
activity, and fast-paced sectors might become stable for a while—most measures of 
clockspeed are aimed at long-term industry trends and norms. 
The literature demonstrates that an industry’s clockspeed does impact various 
aspects of how firms manage their relationships with outside organizations 
(Akkermans et al., 2003; Harrigan, 1984; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007).  
Accordingly, the use of strategic dalliances as a means for establishing loose ties with 
outside organizations and then quickly undoing them may be more successful in some 
industries than others.  Faster moving industries like the semiconductor sector, for 
example, might change and evolve very quickly whether they are actively pursuing 
dalliance-style relationships or not.  The existing forces of evolutionary change 
driving this kind of industry may naturally open up a broad range of opportunities for 
learning about new ideas in other organizations.  But at the other end of the spectrum, 
some sectors that evolve extremely slowly—like the upstream oil and gas industry—
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might not normally be exposed to as many new organizations and ideas simply 
because of the more restrained pace of their industry’s clockspeed.  In essence, the 
overriding competitive priority for DI is conditioned by slow industry clockspeed.  
But strategic dalliances increase exposure to novel information that can spark 
disparate ideas to be connected, thus restoring interest and need for DI.  Accordingly, 
these organizations may therefore benefit most from strategic dalliances. 
Proposition 1:  Strategic dalliances are an effective enabler for the 
discontinuous innovation process in slow clockspeed industries. 
Methodology 
A qualitative methodology was used because we sought to undertake a more 
complete, holistic, and contextual assessment of strategic dalliances and their role in 
fostering DIs (Jick, 1979).  Following Yin (1994), we used a case study method 
because this is a preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon.  Using qualitative case studies 
helps to establish the internal validity of the data also because “[w]hen a relationship 
is supported, the qualitative data often provide a good understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the relationship” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.542) and can make clear when an 
apparent relationship is spurious or the result of an additional variable not originally 
considered in the research design. 
The data for this case study was collected via an initial roundtable discussion 
and a process of semi-structured interviews involving senior-level managers at Shell 
International’s Exploration & Production division and Twister BV between April 
2002 and August 2003.  Each of the discussions was loosely guided by a list of 
questions, but departures from each conversation’s agenda were permitted in the 
interest of exploring new and potentially fruitful points.  The format of the discussions 
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was accordingly adapted and changed slightly from one discussion to the next to 
pursue interesting and particularly relevant new facets of the case study as they 
emerged. 
Yin (1994) and Flick (1998) both recommend using multiple sources of 
evidence in case studies to “triangulate” among various points of view and minimize 
the amount of subjectivity within the study.  To this end, perspectives about key 
decisions were solicited from four senior managers within Shell and an equal number 
in Twister BV.  This approach was used to arrive at conclusions that are broadly in 
agreement and reproducible.  Observations and conclusions were then documented 
and shared with the participating managers to make sure that the case study accurately 
and fairly reflected their opinions and the events that led to the development of the 
Twister cyclone separator, a discontinuous innovation. 
Establishing Twister as a Slow Clockspeed Organization 
Despite Twister BV being only a few years old when this case study was 
compiled,  Fine (1998) specifically identifies the petrochemicals sector as a slow 
clockspeed industry: new product technologies are typically introduced every 10-20 
years, process technologies change every 20-40 years, and the sector tends to undergo 
a period of major organizational restructuring every 20-40 years.  The upstream oil 
and gas industry supplies the principal inputs—that is, oil and natural gas—to the 
petrochemical sector, and many energy giants such as ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP 
have vertically integrated both the upstream and petrochemical elements of the oil and 
gas value chain.  The two sectors are therefore tightly linked and have comparable 
rates of evolution.  Thus, because Twister’s products are exclusively intended for use 
by upstream oil and gas firms, it follows that Twister BV is also a slow clockspeed 
organization in a slow clockspeed industry. 
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Case Study 
Company Description and Industrial Context 
Twister BV was officially a standalone company consisting of only 20 
employees at the time of this case study, but it has always been attached in many 
ways to Royal Dutch Shell, one of Europe’s largest integrated energy companies 
(Hoyos, 2004).  Several of Twister’s executive-level managers are former Shell 
employees who resigned from their positions within Shell to lead the new venture, 
and Twister BV’s head office in the Netherlands is located only a few kilometres from 
Shell’s Exploration and Production R&D laboratories in Rijswijk. 
Twister BV ultimately began when a handful of Shell executives diagnosed a 
longstanding problem within the energy industry in general, and specifically within 
their own company.  They believed that the oil and gas sector could benefit 
significantly from the deployment of innovations, but observed that new technologies 
were absorbed into the industry very slowly.  Considered by some to be “the world’s 
biggest business” (Yergin, 1991, p. 779), the oil and gas industry has an uncommonly 
high profile in the global economy, and energy companies are therefore very sensitive 
about issues such as safety and reputation.  In the words of one industry insider, “the 
cost of failure is very high” (Hilliard, 2003, p. 29).  An unfortunate consequence of 
this heightened sensitivity, however, is that oil and gas firms have historically been 
very conservative, and are often reluctant to make use of promising new 
technologies.1 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that the industry has never made any bold forays into new technology areas.  In a 
bid to diversify outside of the energy industry, Exxon invested nearly $2 billion in the 1970s to develop 
office equipment such as word processors, fax machines, and electronic typewriters.  But as Utterback 
(1994) explains, the company later “retreated to the oil patch after selling its product line to Lanier for 
pennies on the dollar” (p. 14). 
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One particular outside technology that caught Shell’s attention was a novel 
system for removing condensed droplets from flowing gas streams in air conditioning 
systems.  Noordwijk Technologies2, a Dutch design and engineering company with 
nearly 20,000 employees, did not originally have the oil and gas market in mind when 
it developed this technology.  Nonetheless, a manager in Shell heard about 
Noordwijk’s research in this area, and wondered if their innovation could separate 
droplets from natural gas as well as it could in air conditioners. 
Twister BV was an extremely small enterprise in its early days, and relied 
heavily on its outside suppliers as a result.  When the company was first trying to 
introduce the concept of cyclone separators to the oil and gas industry, Noordwijk 
Technologies was responsible for most aspects of the design and production.  Specific 
machining requirements were met by Noordwijk’s existing supplier base, and the 
finished products were assembled by Noordwijk technicians.  Twister BV’s engineers 
and management team at the time, many of whom had only recently left Shell, had 
very little previous exposure to the new technology.  In its nascent stages, the firm 
effectively assumed the role of a “systems integrator” (Ernst and Steinhubl, 1997), 
offering management experience, millions of dollars in capital investment, and in-
field opportunities for trying out prototypes. 
In spite of Noordwijk’s prominent role in the design and production process, 
the new technology also required a significant amount of outside input with regards to 
the aerodynamic and thermodynamic behaviour of fluids travelling at supersonic 
speeds.  These phenomena are relatively well understood within the aircraft and 
aerospace sectors, but engineers in these industries tend to focus principally on 
supersonic flow over wings and along fuselages.  It was not known if or how the 
                                                 
2 This  is not the real name of the company. 
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principles of supersonic flow might be subtly different when rotating within a tube.  
Towards filling these holes in existing research, the Twister team enlisted the help of 
a handful of researchers from universities in the UK and the Netherlands to develop 
highly specialized modelling software for the CFD, thermodynamic, and 
manufacturing aspects of the Twister separator technology. 
Today, the company regards this know-how as an important part of its 
competitive advantage, and retains a large fraction of its R&D work in-house so that it 
will be able to do almost all of its own design concept and process engineering work 
in the future.  In fact, Twister BV’s engineers have become so adept in this area that 
the company now sells its expertise in CFD and natural gas processing systems on a 
consulting basis to other firms as a source of supplementary revenue.  But the Twister 
team still maintains its collaborative research relationships with the outside 
laboratories it worked with in the early days, and recently launched a new R&D link 
to Shell’s high-tech Thornton Research Centre in the UK. 
Not all of the relationships between Twister BV and its original partners are 
still intact, however.  The firm’s relationship with Noordwijk Technologies weakened 
considerably because Noordwijk’s senior managers did not share Twister’s optimism 
about the future prospects of cyclone separator technologies in the oil and gas 
industry.  Although Noordwijk continues to design and manufacture cyclone 
separators for air conditioning applications, the relationship between Noordwijk and 
Twister BV was severed only a few years after the development of the first Twister 
prototypes, leaving Twister BV as the only firm to apply the technology within the 
energy sector. 
In addition to the R&D and conceptual aspects of the technology, Twister’s 
engineers have also taken over the basic mechanical design aspects of the 
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manufacturing process.  As before, however, the detailed design and production 
functions are still handed off to outside suppliers—but not the same ones that 
performed these tasks when Noordwijk Technologies was involved.  Instead, Twister 
BV has developed new ties with a small number of very small, highly specialized 
supplier firms that each consists of between three and ten people.  It is not a company 
policy to buy exclusively from smaller firms, but Twister’s managers have observed 
that small suppliers tend to be flexible and more responsive to Twister’s needs than 
their larger competitors.  In the words of Twister’s CEO and Technical Director, “The 
smaller contractors learn from us.”  Key suppliers have sent their engineers to work 
alongside the Twister BV design team on a full-time basis for as long as two months.  
The CEO explains this practice by noting that, “Having a close relationship with these 
companies benefits us because they come to know the context we are working in, and 
they know our constraints.” 
The company’s preference for smaller suppliers does come at a price, 
however:  Twister BV has to bear almost all of the costs associated with developing 
or acquiring new technologies.  Almost none of the company’s suppliers have 
financial resources that would allow them to invest in long-term R&D.  Also, because 
of the uniqueness and highly customized nature of the parts used in Twister 
separators, the results of any research investment by the suppliers would very likely 
be applicable only to Twister BV’s products.  Twister’s managers do not engage in 
long-term contracts with supplying companies, and these firms are therefore reluctant 
to invest heavily in new technologies for which Twister BV would be the only 
customer. 
But the absence of long-term contracts does not mean that Twister BV does 
not value its suppliers.  Compared to their peers in the industry, Twister managers 
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believe that they place a relatively high premium on long-term supplier relationships.  
Because the industry evolves quite slowly in comparison to other sectors, most of the 
technologies used on a day-to-day basis within the energy industry have been 
available for many years, and are widely available from a broad range of suppliers.  
The components used to construct most oil and gas processing facilities are largely 
modular in nature—that is, they have standardized interfaces, and similar components 
can be purchased from several vendors.  This is not true for Twister’s separators.  
Many of the parts within a Twister unit are made to precise specifications and require 
a considerable amount of know-how on the part of the suppliers.  Twister BV 
accordingly values the relationships it has built within its supply base because of the 
high degree of expertise and specialized skills that collaborating firms must have to 
fulfil their roles competently. 
The highly specific requirements for some aspects of the technology 
sometimes result in situations where Twister’s managers have very few procurement 
options, and the company’s supply base consequently extends to the US and many 
countries in Europe.  For example, one of the internal components of the Twister 
separator is made from molybdenum steel, an alloy that is particularly resistant to 
corrosion.  The variety of this steel that Twister BV requires is very rare, and can only 
be purchased from a single vendor in the US.  Thus, while the company does engage 
in short-term relationships and eschews long-term contracts with the firms in its 
supply network, Twister BV concurrently maintains string inks with several of its 
suppliers. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The intention of the study was to develop a richer understanding of the role 
played by strategic dalliances in slow-paced industries to ascertain if this strategy can 
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enable DI.  This paper has presented research that illustrates a detailed and in-depth 
case study of how a single firm operating within a slow-paced industry attempted to 
introduce DI into its industry by utilizing strategic dalliances. 
Whilst not by design, the supply chain design used to create the first 
generations of the Twister cyclonic separator closely resembled those espoused in the 
strategic dalliances literature.  Initially, the firm branched out and established a more 
relaxed partnership with Noordwijk Technologies, a company that had no prior 
exposure to the oil and gas sector.  In the spirit of strategic dalliances, the affiliation 
between Twister BV and Noordwijk Technologies was loose enough that it could be 
dissolved when the two firms began to disagree on the future of this technology.  The 
same pattern was followed with its later relationships with universities and small firm 
suppliers for example.  But it was necessary for Twister BV to develop and foster 
long-term relationships with several of its suppliers because of its need for specialty 
materials and know-how.   
In light of Noordwijk Technology’s significant contribution to the concept-
level design that eventually led to the Twister separator, it is quite unlikely that either 
Twister BV—or, indeed, the rest of the oil and gas industry—would have been able to 
create this technology without Noordwijk’s help.  Indeed, the very notion of the 
Twister cyclonic separator came from their research and subsequent exposure to novel 
information through loosely coupled links with Noordwijk.  Most of the leading firms 
in the upstream oil and gas sector are incumbents that have been in business for 
decades, and the nature of relationships among companies in the industry is such that 
almost any kind of innovation—especially discontinuous ones—is very difficult 
(Daneshy and Donnelly, 2004).  Senior managers in the sector readily concede that 
there are structural barriers between oil companies and their longstanding suppliers 
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that provide disincentives to innovate (Donnelly, 2006).  But by creating 
nonredundant loose relationships through strategic dalliances, Twister BV was able to 
overcome these structural barriers by idiosyncratically drawing on relationships as 
and when necessary to develop and commercialize the DI.  It would not have been 
possible to achieve the DI due to lack of knowledge and structural barriers had they 
not been able to draw on the novel knowledge of others at key points.  It therefore 
follows that the proposition receives support: strategic dalliances were an effective 
enabler for the DI process in this industry based on the case evidence. 
Implications for Theory 
While strategic dalliances may be a fruitful strategy to every organization 
from time to time, we believe that some industries may be naturally and structurally 
predisposed to benefiting from this approach more than others.  The oil and gas 
industry has traditionally been a conservative sector populated by a fairly predictable 
group of operators and vendors.  Consequently, genuinely discontinuous ideas like 
those used to make the Twister separator do not surface very often—and when they 
do, they frequently face resistance.  Strategic dalliances therefore offered the oil and 
gas industry an opportunity to inject fresh ideas into a historically conservative market 
and allow firms to better develop and commercialize those opportunities through 
innovation.  Through dalliances, the firm encounters novel information and a 
disparate range of knowledge that facilitates the generation of unique insight that can 
foster DI. 
Our conclusion fits with findings of other studies to strongly suggest that slow 
clockspeed industries are more likely to benefit from strategic dalliances than their 
fast clockspeed counterparts.  Specifically, Nadkarni and Narayanan (2007) discover 
that firms in fast clockspeed industries gain competitive advantage from carefully 
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managed internal firm design that embeds strategic flexibility.  The velocity of change 
creates business challenges at the micro firm level in the sense that if their internal 
systems and processes prevent the active throughput of information, creativity and 
innovation, and flexibility to change, their business practices and product innovations 
will not keep pace with the rate of industry change.  The difficulty, however, is that 
industry clockspeed is not necessarily a marker of the rate at which DI takes place.  
Fine (1998) gives an example of the semiconductor industry in which innovation is 
typically incremental but in the circuit board industry, change is often discontinuous.  
Nonetheless, our observation that strategic dalliances appear favourable as a means to 
foster DI in slow clockspeed industries supports Nadkarni and Narayanan’s (2007) 
view that strategic actions of firms in slow-paced industries differs to those in fast-
paced industries.  In this way, this evidence contributes to the classification schemes 
underpinning strategic dalliances.  Still, further research is needed to further 
understand the differences in strategic action. 
Implications for Industry 
The data’s support of our proposition may also impact the strategic thinking of 
managers in the marketplace.  Firms in slow clockspeed industries can learn from 
Shell and Twister BV’s experience with strategic dalliances, and may therefore be 
able to use it as a way to increase their own organization’s DI capacity.  As noted 
earlier, some incumbent firms have used DIs very effectively to expand their business 
in new market segments outside of their usual customer base (Gilbert, 2003), and 
strategic dalliances may be a useful mechanism by which to achieve this objective.  
The difficulty, however, is in maintaining a range of weak ties in the form of strategic 
dalliances in which the social capital generated by the firm allows it to access value-
creating knowledge and resources despite the fact that relationships are not deeply 
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entrenched.  This presents somewhat of a contradiction in the sense that literature on 
social capital, and to a lesser extent embeddedness, indicates that firms should 
develop in-depth relationships to enhance embeddedness which increases exposure to 
novel information (Ireland et al., 2001). 
Conversely, this evidence along with our prior discussion, might give 
managers in fast clockspeed sectors reason to pause and reflect prior to actively 
deploying a strategic dalliances strategy.  The oil and gas industry clearly benefited 
from this approach because it desperately needed exposure to fresh ideas and outside 
perspectives.  By contrast, however, a faster clockspeed industry may already have 
access to so many new ideas that it has difficulty digesting the ones it already has.  
Resource-based theory contends that the energy and attention of the company’s 
managers are “clearly limited in [their] possible scope simply because the capacity of 
any human being is finite” (Penrose, 1980, p.18).  Thus, strategic dalliances might not 
help in environments where a manager already has plenty of new DI possibilities to 
choose from.  Expending any amount of resources or managers’ attention in the 
pursuit of additional inspiration may therefore be of questionable value in these 
situations. 
Directions for Future Research 
While this investigation demonstrated how and why strategic dalliances work 
for slow clockspeed industries, it offers no direct evidence to suggest that this strategy 
does not also work for fast clockspeed sectors.  Findings by Nadkarni and Narayanan 
(2007) indicate that internal firm design factors govern competitive ability in fast-
clockspeed industries rather than any kind of dalliance-style external relationships.  
Unlike this investigation, however, they did not specifically examine DI.  Thus, one 
particularly promising area for future research would be to look specifically at 
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supplier relationships within fast clockspeed industries to confirm that, as suggested 
in this paper, fast-moving companies benefit only marginally from strategic 
dalliances.  A broader quantitative analysis involving many firms of varying 
clockspeeds would also help to categorize the strategic dalliances landscape en route 
to knowing when this strategy should be prescribed. 
The second issue for future research is to examine the workings of dalliances.  
The effective management of strategic alliances and more broadly networks has 
received growing attention over the years (e.g., Ireland et al, 2001).  However, our 
understanding of how to effectively manage and govern strategic dalliances, a 
different type of relationship altogether, is very limited.  Given its value and the fact 
that it does not cleanly subscribe to prominent theories such as social capital, there is 
a need for greater research into how these relationships can be made to work in the 
firm’s favour.  We have shown in this investigation that they can be powerful aids to 
unlocking resources and novel information that can, in turn, aid the DI process.  But 
key questions remain.  How, for example, does such a process begin, and how can it 
be effectively managed without these ties being severed? 
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